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SENSITIVE INFORMATION

I. THE PROBLEM

1. To review US policy and recommend all possible preparations consistent with such policy for the initial psychological exploitation of the situation created within the Soviet communist orbit by the death of Stalin.

II. HISTORY

2. The problem above stated was first made ^{the} subject of formal State Department and CIA study and planning as the result of the Scott memorandum.

3. Following the State Department study, "Death in the Family," it was informally agreed that the State Department would make no comment on the death of Stalin and that CIA would exploit that situation as effectively as possible by covert means.

4. In accordance with this understanding, plan CANCELLATION was prepared and tentatively approved in draft by CIA and the Department of State.

5. However, no implementing orders were issued and requests for supporting intelligence were addressed to IAC and OIR.

6. In July, 1951, there having been no further action on CANCELLATION, a crash plan (LEGACY) to exploit Stalin's death without the build-up of capabilities as set forth in CANCELLATION, was prepared by the Strategic Plans Division.

7. During the ensuing months CANCELLATION and LEGACY were the subject, study, comment, and controversy of amateur modification and

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much profitless talk by many activities within CIA, including some in no way affected, PSB, and Department of State. An elaborate study was prepared by the CENIS group.

8. The comment, aside from tedious re-statement of material on which the plans were based, produced in general two conclusions: (a) that capabilities would have to be increased if the plans were to be executed, and (b) that requirements of the plans would have to be reduced if they were to be implemented with existing capabilities. Plans are thus no closer to implementation than they were when originally submitted.

III. FACTS

9. Policy

a. U.S. operational policy re death of Stalin is essential to overt and covert psychological acts being considered. This guidance is required in advance of the event if advance preparations are to be made. The intimate relation between overt and covert operations in this instance requires that they be issued to both overt and covert agencies. The nature of the event permits development of policy prior to its occurrence. ,

10. Capabilities

a. Overt


(1) Diplomatic statements - US or Allied

(2) US inspired press

(3) VOA - USIS

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- (3) VOA - USIS
- (4) Radio RIAS
- (5) Military Liaison - Berlin - Vienna



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IV. DISCUSSION


11. Policy:

If advance preparations are to have any meaning, the policy that is established in advance must be adhered to at the time of the event. The policy should be in sufficient detail to provide for the development of appropriate overt and covert psychological warfare themes. It should provide for the general US reaction to the death of Stalin

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and indicate in positive tones the type of individual and/or organization we would like to see succeed him in Russia. State has apparently decided, as one aspect of its overt policy, to ignore the event diplomatically. It might possibly issue expressions of hope that the de facto regime in Russia will return to the democratic ideals promulgated in the first steps of the Russian revolution, subsequently betrayed by Stalin.



13. Preparations

Once the overt and covert policies have been established and promulgated to the appropriate agencies, the policy preparations

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can be undertaken to develop the content of actual broadcasts, leaflets, fake editions of Pravda, etc. These preparations should include: (a) Detailed material for overt broadcast announcements such as VOA, BBC, USIS, statements by government officials, etc. Insofar as possible, State Department should endeavor to have allied governments follow a consistent line. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] (c) Leaflets, fake proclamations, etc., for dissemination by balloons. (d) Letter campaigns aimed primarily at Soviet satellite installations abroad. (e) Appropriate demonstrations at Soviet and satellite embassies throughout the world. (f) Sound, specific policy guidance to overseas installations with instructions for automatic implementation as soon as fact of death is definitely established. (g) Specific treatment of themes developed to implement approved policy. Many of the themes developed in LEGACY and CANCELLATION can be used within the framework of policy suggested here or whatever policy may be subsequently agreed upon.

V. ACTION TO BE TAKEN

1. Develop plan in some detail including recommended policy. Target date approximately 15 September.
2. Gain approval of PSB, State and Defense if necessary, in plan including its policy elements. Upon approval of plan issue instructions to both headquarters and field elements to go ahead with

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preparations. From headquarter's point of view this may include purchase and shipment of balloons for large-scale delivery of leaflets, etc. (A part of the policy element of the plan may be approval for large-scale use of balloons at this time.)

3. Prepare operational plans for large-scale release of balloons with Air Force in Washington and overseas. Write and print all leaflets and other propaganda material to be used for the event and hold in secure fashion for later operational use. On the assumption that it will take three months for these initial preparations to be completed, review and keep preparations up-to-date on a three months' basis.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

1. That any further delay in the development of a plan to take advantage of the opportunities that may be presented by Stalin's death is inexcusable. The development of an approved plan leading to orders to execute it should therefore be undertaken immediately.

2. A statement of policy should be promulgated to the field to guide action on Stalin's death pending the assignment of specific area, country, and local tasks under the opc plan.

3. The areas should be directed to plan, and prepared to execute (within the next 90 days) such tasks in connection with the death of Stalin as fall within their capabilities.

4. Areas should be directed forthwith to establish capabilities required where they do not exist, to undertake the tasks which fall in their areas.

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5. The State Department should be asked to re-affirm its position with respect to making no official statement concerning the death of Stalin in order that our covert PW activity may not be interfered with.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the above conclusions be implemented.

Dictated but not read.
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